

A CHANGE OF HEART? SCANDINAVIAN CITIZENS' DISPOSITIONS TOWARDS IMMIGRATION AS MEASURED BY VOTING AND POLITICAL POLLS

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Introduction

Deliberative democracy and the formation of public opinion is, for Habermas, anchored in the conversations of ordinary citizens. Researching the history of deliberation on the immigration issue in Scandinavia, then, means realizing that most things said and thought about the subject is lost forever. We are left with remains which, for specific reasons was preserved when most were lost - debates and coverage in parliament and the press, some literary and academic works on the theme, documentaries and drama, scattered comments in the social media and so forth. These deliberative relics are almost endless but, at the same time, only bits and pieces of a great conversation, and their chance of preservation very partial. If you were a politician or a regular newspaper columnist, an academic, an author or a documentary filmmaker, your views were not just more likely to be voiced and have weight and visibility in the debate at the time, but also to be well preserved and centrally exhibited for posterity, with a chance of functioning as conversation pieces for later debate - "The editor once criticized ... the author notably attacked ... the documentarist unmasked ... the professor argued".

But what about the views of ordinary Scandinavians on immigration? The Vox Publica of letters to the editor in newspapers, as we have discussed briefly in elsewhere, gives some insight into less elite-dominated groups' thinking about immigration, but they are very unlikely to "represent" the general public in a statistical sense (Gans, 1980; Nielsen, 2010), and the same seems very much to be true also for comments in social media (I. Andersen, 2020). This is probably especially true for a controversial issue like immigration, where few are willing or capable of formulating and exposing their views in public (Ibid.) However, what about the effectively *voiceless* in the public sphere (Fraser, 1992) - people who just sometimes talked about the immigration issue with their close friends but never in public? Or was silent on the issue but read and watched and thought about the issue in private? For systematic accounts of people's thoughts and leanings on the immigration issue over a longer time, we are restricted to mainly two sources - voting patterns and answers in national polls. A discussion of such patterns, however, must necessarily be a double history.

The first history concerns voting and polls as a *measurement* of citizens' opinions on immigration. Some important questions are here how citizens in the three countries differ, if the differences have increased, lessened, or been stable in the fifty years under study, if people generally have become more or less open to immigration, and how positions on more specific arguments (e.g., the number of immigrants to admit) have changed. Here, voting and polls appear to tell very different stories. The emergence and success of anti-immigrant parties in

Scandinavia from the seventies evidently express a public that is, at least in part, strongly hostile to immigrants. Polls, on the other side, seem to tell a story of gradual, more welcoming attitudes. Both sources suggest persistent differences between the three countries, with Sweden having the most positive, Denmark the most negative views on immigration. The second history concerns the *uses* of voting and immigrant polls. As the emergence of anti-immigration parties, the introduction and increasing popularity of, and changing emphasis on different parts of the immigration issue in opinion polls is in itself an indicator of the salience of the issue in public debate and what issues were at the forefront. And results of both voting and polls are not merely "measures" of opinion. They are also weapons - widely published and discussed - whereby groups try to formulate and speak on behalf of citizens to exert real effects in the world (Bourdieu, 1993). Just as interesting as knowing that 73% of Swedes in 1969 agreed that immigrants just came to exploit welfare services (Lange and Westin 1997), then, is to know who formulated and paid for the question, their motivation for this, and how this was used to support specific arguments in the subsequent debate - by politicians, by researchers, by journalists etc. Who were the definers of specific immigration issues as *public problems* (Neveu, 2015) that required measurement in polls? Moreover, what was the effect of this intervention on the following debate? Here we need also to take into account, as demonstrated by Susan Herbst (1998) in her study of the USA, that different groups have different ideas of what constitutes a public opinion. Policy experts, for example, find press coverage a more reliable indicator of opinion than polls, whereas somewhat the reverse is the case for pressure groups, and journalists seem to rely more on individual statements of their readers. This is however, a history that remains to be written in the case of the immigration issue in Scandinavia.

We will first provide some critical notes on some limitations of using voting results and polls as measures of public opinion on immigration before giving a careful reading of these. Due to limited data, the discussion of the pre-2000s polls will be relatively brief, and the main emphasis will be on the period 2002-2014, which offers the first real opportunity to compare Scandinavian attitudes on immigration. Our main aim will here not be to untangle the complicated reasons *why* people might hold specific opinions but provide a guarded assessment of the *when* and *who*, polls as indicative of ordinary people's leanings on the immigration issue, focusing not only on national differences and trends regarding the ongoing debates but also how different social groups differ in their leanings on these issues. If Scandinavians have had a "change of heart" in regard to immigration, when did this happen, and who changed their hearts? The statistical relation between leanings on immigration and the holders of those opinions (especially their social status) also makes it possible to suggest something about the changing legitimacy of immigration opinions, being heterodoxa or doxa, their place and movement between the spheres of consensus, legitimate controversy, and deviance (Hallin, 1986).

On voting and opinion polls as measures on public opinion on immigration

As measures of public opinion, both voting patterns and opinion polls have significant limitations. For voting patterns, the problem is not just the general nature of political parties (people might vote for an "anti-immigration" party because other issues, e.g., economic liberalization, are more important to them than immigration, and the opposite is also possible), but also that parties with clear anti-immigration profiles did not arise at the same time in all countries, Sweden, e.g., not having such a party in the national assembly until 2010, save for the short-lived New Democracy from 1991 to 1994, which meant that there was then no

established outlet for anti-immigration sentiment in the voting booth. Comparative opinion poll data for the Scandinavian countries is sparse. Furthermore, when polls ask seemingly very similar questions, minor differences in wording and context can have a significant impact on the responses (Foddy, 1993). The period before 2000 must therefore be limited to a side-by-side reading of the most important national polls. For such reasons alone, our interpretation of both voting patterns and results from political polls as expressions of opinions on immigration must be very cautious.

There are, however, other reasons to be cautious of opinion polls than the lack of comparable historical data. Herbert Bluhmer (1954, p. 543) noted more than seventy years ago that polls are a poor, even dangerous measure of opinions, arguing that their meaning is not just a scientific issue, but historically and socially contingent, getting "its form from the social framework in which it moves, and from the social processes in play in that framework." As a measurement of public opinion, polls have been criticized for mainly measuring opinions that are 1) private, 2) provoked, 3) non-organized, 4) limited to their verbalized forms, 5) non-discriminatory in terms of intensity, 6) non-discriminatory in terms of the competence of those being surveyed, and 7) not the systematic product of deliberations (Blondiaux, 2003).

The first problem has to do with the nebulous term of "public opinion", which has consistently resisted easy definitions (Walter Lippman famously calling it a "phantom"). If public polls on the immigration issue appear to have some aspects of Rousseau's concept of "the general will", such polls are for Jürgen Habermas clearly something very distant from his concept of public opinion. Preferences in polls do for him not reliably reflect the actual preferences "if by 'preferences' one means the preferences they would express after weighing the relevant information and arguments." (Habermas, 1996, p. 336)

Public opinion is not representative in the statistical sense. It is not an aggregate of individually gathered, privately expressed opinions held by isolated persons. Hence it must not be confused with survey results. Political opinion polls provide a certain reflection of "public opinion" only if they have been preceded by a focused public debate and a corresponding opinion-formation in a mobilized public sphere. (1996, p. 362).

Already in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* published in the sixties, Habermas argued that with the collapse of the bourgeois public sphere, public opinion had decomposed into, on the one hand, "informal opinions of private citizens without a public" and on the other hand, "publicly effective institutions", where the former were caught in "a vortex of publicity staged for shorn or manipulation" and laid claim to "not by public communication but by the communication of publicly manifested opinions." (Habermas, 1989, 247). While his account of this collapse and its consequences has been later somewhat modified (Habermas, 1987, 1996), the fundamental argument remains: Politicians and the state have become more detached from and impervious to the concerns, norms and values of citizens' lifeworld and, in the words of Terry Goodknight (1992,246), replaced citizens' "sagacious advisory discourse where real power is transmitted" with "an appearance strategically sculpted to make a seamless convincing impression". The public realm ceases to be a place for a real debate on public matters and becomes dominated by strategic movement and the pragmatic struggle for power.

While Habermas (1996) appears to acknowledge that polls sometimes can bring into play significant concerns and arguments to the public debate, the increasing use, and analysis of modern opinion polls is to him not as much a resolution as a symptom of the democratic

problems of the refeudalized public sphere, and a central mechanism of its perversion. Polls, by mimicking electoral political participation, reduce serious, complex discussions on matters of common interest in the public via open, informed argumentation to simple and narrow statistical measures of isolated choices (yes/no, more or less negative or positive).

A related critique, focusing on the consequences of social inequality, is given by Pierre Bourdieu (1993). Dubbing political polls "a science without a scientist", he denies the notion of public opinion as "a meaningless artifact." His argument rests on three implicit postulates shown by the use and presentation of such polls, which he finds "demonstrably false". The first is related to Habermas's argument, namely the idea that *everyone has an opinion on the issue* asked by the poll, which is disproved by distinct social patterns of nonresponse. The second assumption is that there is an agreement on what questions are worth asking and as its bare minimum that *everyone can reflect on the question in the same way*, which are disproved by comprehension tests and evidence that classes use very different *modes* of response to political questions, where answering such abstract and hypothetical questions are more natural for the educated classes (see also Gaxie, 1978). This is linked not only to them often being more knowledgeable on the specific issue, but also to their better knowledge of the specific logic and current positions in the political field, and a stronger sense of "the right" to speak and hold such opinions. Popular classes, lacking this, "respond not to the question that is actually asked, but to a question they produce from their resources, i.e., from the practical principles of their class ethos" (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 435). When poll results are aggregated to national averages, such effects can result in a very distorted view of the public. The third assumption of political polls identified by Bourdieu is that *all opinions are equivalent and have the same weight*. This blatantly goes against the fact that mobilization of such opinions depends on the resources (capital) of the groups that can be mobilized on behalf of this opinion in the political field. Emphasizing some of the same problems of Habermas he makes a distinction between *mobilized opinion*, "formulated opinion, pressure groups mobilized around a system of explicitly formulated interests" and *dispositions* which "are not opinion if one means by that (...) something that can be formulated in discourse with some claim to coherence" (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 157). A similar argument is given by Fraser (1992), saying that subaltern classes are often voiceless and incapable of arguing according to official rules. In Bourdieu's view, careful analysis of national polls can show us something of the latter aspect of public opinion, but not the first, which must be sought elsewhere.

For both Habermas and Bourdieu, polls are thus generally seen as more damaging to public debate than useful, favorable to elites, and short-circuiting deliberative and political processes. Whereas Habermas recognizes that polls can exert an effect on politicians' positioning on issues (he once criticized Angela Merkel for being *demoskopiegeleitet*, "led by polls" (Habermas, 2011), he does, however present a relatively passive view of polls as part of the "publicity" that reduces public discourse to little more than "show and display". Bourdieu offers a more fundamental critique, seeing the use of political polls not only flawed (or even illegitimate) science but a practice that fundamentally changed the rules of the political field. Patrick Champagne writes, inspired by Bourdieu's analysis, of the situation in France, which could just as well be a description of Scandinavia:

"... in effect [by the introduction of polls], public opinion is no longer the (...) addition of the opinions of those who have an opinion on a given issue, and who, above all mobilize to make it publicly known and strive to impose it on political decisions makers by product of lobbying or spectacular public actions; it is the product of the mobilization of survey-takers ... public opinion tends henceforth to

be politically constructed by questioning a sample of the population, the great majority of whom (...) may have no pre-constituted opinion on the problem posed to them - or imposed on them by the questionnaire .." (Champagne, 2005)

The above arguments suggest at best a complicated and, worse, contingent (depending on the particular political context, events, the state of immigration and the public debate on the issues, the background of the respondent etc.) link between public opinion on the immigration issue and what is measured by polls (we could here have added many common methodological worries found in every basic book on survey methods). Far from the coordinated "manufacture of consent" as described by Chomsky (1988) or dictated by a "power elite" (Mills, 1981), the above critique paints a picture of a complicated struggle between, and also inside, competing elites (e.g., journalists, politicians, business leaders) for some hegemony on the claim to the will of the people, and legitimacy for their views and strategies - in our case, about the immigration issue. For this particular thorny issue, Foucault's (1977,223) argument of polls as a central disciplinary mechanism, used by social elites to "characterize, classify, specialize; distribute along a scale, around a norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one another and, if necessary, disqualify and invalidate" appears particularly relevant.

Polls in this perspective not only *measure* the limits of what subjects and arguments are acceptable to put up for debate on the immigration issue - what in Scandinavian debates is often referred to as the "opinion corridor" [Åsiktskorridor] - but is also a central way of *producing* these limitations. For example, by discussing the "problem" of lowly educated being more "negative" to immigrants, morally worthless attitudes are publically associated with socially worthless people (and of course, the reverse), leaning on larger discourses of working-class people as pathological (Skeggs, 2004). In effect, this can lead to that their genuine concerns are ridiculed and not seen as worth debating. As argued by Fraser (1992), ideas of "common good" and a "consensus" of public opinion mask underlying conflicting, sometimes irresolvable interests and by this also delegitimizes the views and agents outside this consensus.

The many problems we have noted with polls as a measure of public opinion on immigration go far beyond the restricted and ritual methodological worries by pollsters of "skewed samples" and "margins of error". It means, first, that our comparative reading of national differences and historical movements in the polls as an expression of changing public opinion on immigration must necessarily be very cautious. Reading such polls can not, as they are commonly interpreted, offer a "base truth" on the state of public opinion on immigration, but only one of many indicators of it, mainly in the form of vague leanings on the issue (Bourdieu's *dispositions* rather than *positions* in the political sense). It also actualizes the old but still very relevant critique of a dominant "whole nation bias" (Rokkan, 1970, p. 49) in comparative research, with the need to move beyond national averages and consider how different leanings play out in different groups with varying interests, in our case, social classes. We will return to this later theme in the later parts of this chapter. First, however, we will discuss, cautiously, some of the patterns emerging from voting and poll results.

National voting patterns and the immigration issue

One gauge of public opinion is the relative strength of pro- and anti-immigration parties, where the latter is much more easily defined than the former. Anti-immigrant parties have emerged and become electorally successful in each country. The Progress parties of Denmark


and Norway emerged in the early 1970s as right-wing protest parties of entrepreneurial origins and added opposition to immigration to their issue profiles in the 1970s and 1980s (J. G. Andersen & Bjørklund, 2000; Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2011; Elgenius & Rydgren, 2018; Ivarsflaten, 2007; Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Jupskås, 2018; Rydgren, 2004; Widfeldt, 2018). While these parties are largely defined by their anti-immigration stance – a 2007 study by Ivarsflaten found that it is the only common denominator of those that are electorally successful, and the primary reason voters support them (Arzheimer, 2018), the structural complexity of political parties as institutions with three faces – the party as an organization, the party in the electorate, and the party in public office (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002; Key, 1964; Mjelde & Svåsand, 2016) – makes them a somewhat a complex gauge of public sentiment on immigration. Whereas party manifestos may be considered the voice of the party as an organization, both the party’s public statements as reported by the media and their electoral performance represent the voice of the party in the electorate, that is, the party as a group of members and activists speaking for and communicating with the voters, with government policy arguably reflecting the voice of the party in public office. What the party is saying in the press might deviate from what the party is saying in its program, especially since parties are complex entities. They have hierarchical structures linking party organizational units at multiple levels (i.e., national, regional). At each level in the hierarchy, there are usually several party units (i.e., women and youth branches). For larger parties, there are elected representatives in local and regional councils, national parliaments, sometimes in government, either alone or in a coalition – or as supporting parties in parliament. Parties are comprised of active and passive members and are headed by party leadership, and the party leadership itself may be divided into several offices (Katz and Mair 1994). Inside the party, the viewpoints of leaders might diverge from those of mid-level activists and voters – which are the most radical ones will vary depending on the context, as explained by May’s law of curvilinear disparity (May, 1973). Moreover, party manifestos are issued ahead of elections that take place usually every four years or so, and an issue might emerge in the middle of a parliamentary term with the party responding in an ad-hoc fashion to it, as was the case with the Syrian migration crisis arising in the spring of 2015. Or, as is likely the case with the immigration issue, a specific event, such as the Balkan wars, might trigger a discourse of its own that is related to, but somewhat different from how the parties address immigration in their manifestos. Thus, anti-immigration parties that represent a minority of the electorate, and that have historically often been weakly institutionalized and dominated by idiosyncratic leaders and strongly divided or even torn apart by internal conflicts, such as all the Scandinavian ones – at least in their early years, are likely to be hazy reflections of public opinion on the immigration issue.

In order not to get bogged down by this structural complexity, we will consider the anti-immigration parties and public opinion from a supply-side and a demand-side perspective. The former deals with the importance of the immigration issue and viewpoints as expressed by the party and its leaders, the latter is about voter support for such viewpoints. Jupskås (2018) usefully characterizes the Progress parties of Denmark and Norway that emerged in the “electoral earthquakes” of 1973 in Denmark and Norway as the first generation of right-wing populist parties. From a demand-side perspective, these parties were not about opposition to immigration; rather, they “opposed increased taxes, the growing bureaucracy, the expansion of the (Scandinavian) welfare state and foreign aid” (p. 2; see also Andersen and Bjørklund 2000), and that was the message that propelled their sudden electoral breakthrough. From a supply-side perspective, however, there were multiple examples of their leaders and representatives making anti-immigration and racist statements early on. As for instance

Gripsrud (2018) shows, Norwegian Progress Party founder Anders Lange had been a supporter of Apartheid, and prominent party representatives, including party leader Carl I. Hagen, are on record making numerous anti-immigrant statements in the 1970s, including in the press. These examples can be interpreted as early elite-level expressions of latent hostility towards immigration in the population that the new parties would gradually seek to mobilize much more systematically and aggressively from the 1980s and onward, following the influx of asylum seekers (cf. Downs, 1957). In Sweden, the short-lived New Democracy, which burst onto the political scene in 1994, combined both the initial anti-tax and regulation message of the Progress parties and ethno-pluralism.

The second generation of this new party family – the Danish People’s Party, the Norwegian Progress Party after the 1994 expulsion of the libertarian faction and the Sweden Democrats – were defined by nativism. The Danish Progress Party was supplanted by the splinter Danish People’s Party in the mid-1990s – a more proto-typical radical right party. In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats won parliamentary representation in 2010. In Denmark and Norway, these parties have also supported or entered the government in the 2000s. With Sweden no longer a deviant case in Scandinavia (Rydgren, 2002), the presence of institutionalized anti-immigrant parties that get 15-20 percent of the vote is now a feature of the region’s party system, as shown in Figure 1:

Figure 1: National election results of Scandinavian populist radical right parties, 1973-2019. Percentages.



Sources: Parties and Elections¹; Harmel et al. (2018).

The two Progress parties spoke relatively little about immigration in their first 10 to 15 years, but by the turn of the century, anti-immigration attitudes at both the elite and voter level had aligned. The immigration issue was politicized in the electorate already by the 1987

¹ www.parties-and-elections.eu/countries.html.

elections in Norway and somewhat earlier in Denmark. As Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) have convincingly argued, the structure of party competition kept the issue off the agenda up until the 2010 election in Sweden. As mentioned, a number of studies has underscored the importance of the immigration issue for these parties' electoral success. Jupskås (2018, 12) summarizes:

Comparative analyses of the electorate in the Scandinavian countries further demonstrate that the voters for the DF, the FrP and the SD hold 'extreme anti-immigration positions compared to most other parties' (Bengtsson et al. 2013: 39). These analyses also show how strongly these attitudes correlate with party choice, especially in Denmark.

In sum, the emergence of viable anti-immigration parties suggest the emergence of a public that is in part strongly hostile to immigrants. On the other hand, as Widfeldt (2018, 7) notes, "their exact positions and the relative priority they place on immigration issue vary". The fact that they appear to have stabilized electorally – at least none of them are currently near hitting the 30 percent mark indicates that they represent a segment of the public that remains a clear minority in terms of the views on immigration. Furthermore, they are at least by some scholars considered less radical than other European far-right parties, and the Norwegian Progress Party is less radical than the Swedish Democrats and the Danish People's Party (see, e.g., Widfeldt 2018; Jungar and Jupskås 2014). As a gauge of public opinion on the immigration issue, voter support for anti-immigration parties is a rather blunt instrument. To get a (comparatively) more fine-grained sense of where the public stands on the issue, we turn to public opinion polls.

The tale of immigration polls

Recent comparative surveys of European attitudes to immigration show that Scandinavians tend to have the most positive views of immigrants in Europe, while Southern and Eastern European countries appear to be the most negative (Commission, 2018; Heath, Schmidt, et al., 2016; Pew, 2019). Also, the nature of attitudes varies. Green (2007), based on ESS data from 2002 of 21 countries, identified three main groups based on the national majorities' varying support for individual (e.g., language and working skills, criminal acts) and categorical (e.g., skin colour, religion) criteria for entrance to or exclusion from the country. *Strict gatekeepers* favored all criteria, *lenient gatekeepers* opposed all criteria, whereas *individualist gatekeepers* favored individual and opposed categorical criteria. Strict gatekeepers were common in Southern and Eastern European nations, individualist gatekeepers in Western European countries, and lenient gatekeepers in Scandinavian countries. The latter position, as the author notes, has much in common with the 'egalitarians' in Pettigrew and Meertens' (1995) typology. The image and self-image of Scandinavians as a region in Europe characterized by more humanitarian and egalitarian attitudes towards immigration appears thus well-founded (the phrase of Sweden being a "humanitarian superpower" has been used without any hint of irony by Foreign and Prime Ministers). Later surveys suggest these European differences are pretty stable². Before the 2000s, the lack of

² In a 2017 survey by Pew Research Center (2018) measuring nationalist, anti-immigrant and anti-religious minority attitudes in 15 Western European countries on a scale from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest), the Scandinavian countries ranked in the bottom five. Sweden had the lowest median score (1.2), and Norway (2.5) and Denmark

data makes the comparison more uncertain, but what exists paints a picture of relatively high tolerance of immigration in Scandinavia also from the mid-nineties, but with less differences between Scandinavians and other countries before that.

Figure 2. Europeans' attitudes to the impact of immigration. European Social Survey 2002/14 (Heath et al., 2014)





Figure 3: National attitudes towards having immigrants as neighbours (Source: World Value Surveys, 1981-2020.)



Within Scandinavia, Sweden, in most statistics, stands out as seeing immigration as least problematic, Danish the most. Studying the period 2002-2014, Bohman (2018) found that

(2.7) the third and fifth lowest, respectively. The highest score was found in Italy (4.1), followed by Portugal (3.5). Eurobarometer data from 2017 suggest the same geographic pattern: Asked if immigration from outside of Europe is more of a problem or an opportunity for the country, 19 percent of Swedes and 24 percent of Danes saw it as more of a problem. By contrast, 63 percent thought so in Hungary, Malta, and Greece (European Commission 2018). Moreover, a 2007 worldwide Pew survey of 47 countries showed that of the 12 European countries included, the percentage of respondents disagreeing with the statement that immigration should be further restricted and controlled was highest in Sweden (43 percent) and lowest in Italy (10 percent).

nativist and economic opposition were most widespread in Denmark, but the latter rises in all the countries over time. Danes were most likely to differentiate between categories of immigrants, Swedes the least. Before the 2000s, the Scandinavian differences in opinion are more uncertain due to the lack of good comparative data. Here, we must instead rely on national polls (Text box 1). In sum, Norwegians and Swedes appear to have become more positive about immigration over time, according to some of the data, but there is much fluctuation and possibly signs of more negative attitudes in recent years, particularly in Sweden. On balance, the Danish data also indicates a shift towards more favorable attitudes over time, but, as in Sweden, there is some evidence of an adverse turn in the most recent decade.

Text box 1: National polls on immigration

NORWAY

In 1981, Vaage published a report of press coverage of immigration and how it appeared to impact Oslo residents' views of immigrants, finding that they considered immigration about as important as various other issues. About 75 percent of the respondents agreed that immigrants were being discriminated against and exploited in the housing market, and as many disagreed with the propositions that immigrants caused housing shortage and unemployment. Vaage concludes that there is considerable overlap between the issues covered by the press (e.g., human suffering) and what the respondents have formed firm opinions about. A 1990 study by Hernes and Knutsen looked at both attitudes to the moratorium on immigration instituted in 1975 and providing financial support for immigrants so that they can maintain their culture. Using data from Norsk Gallup, they found that four in five Norwegians favored an extension of the moratorium in 1980. It fell modestly to three quarters in 1985 but had risen to the 1980 level again by 1988. Support for the moratorium thus appeared both high and stable. Data from the electoral studies showed that two-thirds of Norwegians opposed financial support in 1988, nearly a 20 percentage-point increase since 1985.

Hellevik and Knutsen (2017) offer the most comprehensive summary of attitudes over time, tracking trends in respondent data from 1993 to 2015. While negative attitudes appear to rise in the wake of the Syrian migration crisis, they find that more people have become positive to receiving more refugees; fewer consider immigrants a threat; the share of respondents who want to restrict immigration decreases; more people think immigrants contribute to society (rather than being a financial burden); and Norwegians have become less negative to Muslim religious organizations. More recent data (2002-2016) show that the vast majority of people are OK with having an immigrant neighbor, and a fast-growing number of people would accept their son or daughter marrying an immigrant; more believe immigrants enrich the national culture and make a positive contribution in the workplace; the share of people who think immigrants make the country less safe has decreased; but while more respondents believe it should become easier for refugees and asylum seekers to obtain legal residency, there was still an overweight of people who oppose it in 2016. It should be noted, however, that attitudes were overwhelmingly negative in the early decades for several of these variables, and the trends reflect only a relatively modest shift in the direction of more positive attitudes. The authors conclude that overall, Norwegians seem to have become increasingly positive to immigrants over the last decades. However, data from The Integration Barometer (2005-2018) are more ambiguous with respect to the long-term trends than the data in Hellevik and Knutsen's study. On the one hand, 40-50 percent agreed that Norway should not take in more immigrants, and the rest disagreed. The figures fluctuated modestly within the 12-year period, but about 60 percent disagreed in 2017. On the other hand, only 20 percent think the integration of immigrants is going well, a number that has remained stable since 2005 (Brekke, Fladmoe, & Wollebæk, 2020).

A third source of longitudinal data is the Norwegian electoral studies. The ability to track changes over time has been hampered by varying questions. However, they show that whereas only 4 percent of voters mentioned immigration as an important issue in 2001, 23 percent mentioned it in 2017 – no other issue was mentioned more. The major shift occurred in 2009, when 16 percent identified it as important – a ten percentage point increase from 2005 (Bergh & Karlsen, 2019, 29). Second, on the question of whether voters wanted a more liberal or a more restrictive immigration policy, with 0 being 'easier to get access' and 10 'more restrictions on the number of immigrants', most voters in the 1989, 2013, and 2017 elections grouped around 5, with a minority wanting a more restrictive policy, and even fewer wanting a more liberal policy (Jenssen & Ivarsflaten, 2019, 139). This suggests that public opinion on the immigration picture is relatively stable.

Finally, recent data from Statistics Norway show that about 70 percent agreed in 2009, 2017, and 2018 that immigrants are valuable workers. Over the same period, 70 percent agreed that immigrants enrich

Norwegian culture; about 25-30 percent agreed, and 50 percent disagreed that immigrants make Norway less safe; and about 50 percent thought it should be as easy/difficult for refugees and asylum seekers to obtain legal residency in Norway as it currently is. In 2009, 50 percent wanted to make it more difficult, and that share dropped to a third in the two most recent years.

SWEDEN

The available Swedish data are more comprehensive than the Norwegian and Danish, and we will only present some overall trends in this review. Moreover, they include data from prior to the 1970s, reflecting Sweden's longer history of taking in immigrants. SIFO and CEIFO offers detailed data from the earlier decades, and the findings are mixed. A survey from SIFO found that while only 13 percent of Swedes thought there was too much immigration in 1957, nearly 50 percent thought so in 1970. The share of those who thought Sweden had taken in about the appropriate amount fell from 66 to 45 percent (SIFO 1970). Public opinion remained relatively stable over the next couple of decades; 44 percent of Swedes said in 1981 and 1993 that the country should not take in any more immigrants after dipping to 33 percent in 1987 (Lange and Westin 1997). The population was more uncertain about its consequences; in 1970, a third of the respondents thought the level of immigration was a net benefit for Sweden, and a third thought it was a net minus, although the former doubled from 1957 (SIFO 1970).

Moreover, the share of those who thought many immigrants came to exploit welfare services dropped from 73 percent in 1969 to 50 percent by 1981, remained unchanged in 1987 (51%) but rose modestly in the 1993 poll (63%) (Lange and Westin 1997). A large majority still agreed in both 1969 (71%) and 1993 (59%) that society should enable immigrants to maintain their language and traditions, although most respondents in both 1969 (74%) and 1993 (68%) thought it would behoove immigrants intending to stay in Sweden to become as Swedish as they could. Finally, data from the SOM institute reported by Demker (2014) finds that in 2015, markedly fewer (40%) thought that receiving fewer immigrants would be a good thing, compared to 1990 (61%). In another article from SOM institute, Demker (2012) reports that from 1993 to 2009, approximately a fifth of Swedes fully supported the proposition that immigrants should be able to practice their religion in Sweden freely, and the number increased to 27 percent in 2011. Moreover, SOM data shows that the percentage of respondents who thought there were too many immigrants in Sweden dropped from 52 in 1993 to 36 in 2009 (Delmi 2018). Strömberg concludes that overall, the research indicates that Swedes have become more positive towards immigrants, but that attitudes stabilized in the 2000s and may actually have become more negative in the most recent years, although that remains to be established (Delmi 2018: 9).

The Swedish electoral studies contain a series of questions on attitudes on immigration from 1979 to 2018. Immigration was for long a minor issue; in 2002, a record ten percent identified it as important for their party choice. Twenty-three percent and 30 percent said the same in 2014 and 2018, respectively, making it a top issue (Oscarsson & Holberg, 2020, 26). Swedes have become markedly more negative on multiculturalist policy; the share who thought immigrants should receive increased financial support to preserve their own culture dropped from 38 percent in 1979 to 5 percent in 2018. Forty-one percent disagreed in 1979 and 74 percent in 2018, a marked increase from 2014. From 1994 to 2018, most voters still supported the idea of a society tolerant of foreigners with different cultures and religions. Throughout the period, about a third favored and about a third opposed taking in fewer refugees, albeit with a slight increase over the period in those favoring it, except for the clear reverse from 2014 to 2018. From 2002 to 2018, about a third favored increased labor migration, about 40 percent opposed it. Overall, attitudes remained relatively stable, but public opinion became more negative from 2014 to 2018 (Hedberg, 2019, 64-5).

DENMARK

A variety of studies reveal a broadly similar development in Denmark, where some of the questions asked (and answers) stand out, compared to the available evidence in Norway and Sweden. Goul Andersen (2002, 9) shows that in 1970, 61 percent of Danes agreed with the statement that some peoples are simply less intelligent than others. By 1993, that share had dropped to 40 percent, which still seems remarkably high given the provocative statement. Relatedly, in 1970, 55 percent thought that foreigners should only be eligible for Danish citizenship if they learn to behave like proper Danes, a percentage that fell to 47 percent in 1993. The share of Danes who want to restrict refugees' entry into Denmark fluctuated between 50 and 70 percent from 1985 to 2002 (p.11), although it reached a high of 82 percent in 1986.

A study of Danish voters' attitudes from 1971 to 2015 offers the most comprehensive data. 'Refugees' were identified as an increasingly important issue from the late 1980s and onwards, with 20 percent viewing it as the most important issue in 2001 and 2015. In 1990, 43 percent of voters thought the government spends too much money on refugees and immigrants, and the percentage remained stable over the next decade but dropped

in the mid-2000s, with only 25 percent agreeing in 2005. The number increased again over the next elections, with 41 percent agreeing in 2015. Only a quarter, at the most (2005), thought the government spends too little money. Asked if refugees and immigrants should have the same rights to social services as Danes, even if they are not (Danish) citizens, 69 percent was against in 1969. That share dropped gradually to a low of 46 in 2007, after which the percentage opposed grew in each election, reaching 60 percent in 2015. In 1990, 68 percent agreed that Muslim countries represent a threat to Danish security in the long run. It fell to 40 in 1994, and then rose gradually to 48 percent by 2007. The electorate was split 48-48 in 1987/88 as to whether or not immigration represents a serious threat to the Danish national character, with a slight plurality disagreeing over the next elections. The split widened around 2010, with only 31 percent agreeing in 2011. That share jumped to 41 by 2015, however. Finally, from 2001 to 2007, nearly 60 percent thought integration would happen by itself if only immigrants were employed.

Polling by Kantar/Gallup showed that a clear majority of Danes think immigrants should adapt to Danish culture and norms. The percentage dropped from 75 in 1995 to 64 in 2001, but rose to 92 by 2011, while the share of Danes who want a multiethnic Denmark grew from 16 percent in 1995 to 54 percent in 2011. Furthermore, in 2011, 85 percent thought immigration benefits the Danish economy, up from 34 percent in 1970 (Holst, 2018).

Who moves when immigration opinion moves?

The immigration issue is not one thing, but rather a compound of issues where citizens can be “positive” to some aspects of immigration but not others. Whom should we receive, how many, and the effects (e.g., cultural or economical) of immigration has on society are some of the recurring themes for public debate. While some people have consistent positive or negative views across such issues, others probably do not. Some might be against refugees as neighbors but accept high levels of immigration, others might hold reverse views, and such views can be combined with views of specific requirements for entrance or specific detrimental or positive effects of immigration. In other words, rather than an attitude towards immigration, we should rather speak of a cluster of attitudes (or better, dispositions) that might be combined in different ways.

The first good opportunity for a comparative, historical view of Scandinavians' reported attitudes on immigration appeared with the European Social Surveys modules on immigration of 2002 and 2014 (Commission, 2018). This was an eventful period in the history of the immigration debate in Scandinavia, and as noted, a time of success for anti-immigrant parties. Following the aftermaths of the 9/11 attack and a general atmosphere of fear of further acts of Islamic-inspired acts of terrorism, other problematic sides of Islamic culture came to the forefront. In particular, two events led to intense debate. The first was the honor killing of the Kurdish immigrant Fadime in Sweden in 2002 by her relatives, and the second the “cartoon crisis” following the widespread protests and death threats following the publication of the Mohammed cartoons in *Jyllandsposten* in 2005. Norway also experienced a massacre of 69 members of the Workers' Youth league youth politicians by a right-wing extremist whose ideology blamed Islam (and feminism) for a European “cultural suicide” and called for the deportation of all Muslims from Europe. In the same period, all three countries received increased immigration, not least caused by the expansion of EU's eastern borders in 2004, while shortcomings in integrative efforts became apparent and highlighted in public debate. The Syrian refugee crisis, however, was still below the radar for most people.

In the following part, we will use the data from 2002 and 2014 to suggest a typology of Scandinavians' leanings on the immigration issue. This will be used - together with selected questions from the surveys - to not only provide a detailed look at the national differences and general changes in this period but also to explore how different positions on immigration

issues varies by social class, which together with their rarity can indicate which issues have been inside or outside the consensus in the three countries.

A four-group typology of Scandinavians dispositions towards immigration

To establish the main grouping of attitudes to immigration in Scandinavia, we have used three sets of variables in the ESS data for the three countries (N=10,270)³, selected by their relevance and availability for both 2002 and 2014: Five variables for what should be requirements for immigration (whom to receive), four on their willingness to accept many or fewer immigrants from different regions (how many), and four on perceived changes immigrants bring to the country (to what effect). From these data, four main groups of immigration attitudes can be identified via cluster analysis⁴: (1) Anti-immigrants (27%), (2) Sceptics (11%), (3) Integrators (40%), and (4) Humanitarians (22%).

Anti-immigrants and Sceptics are both markedly more negative to the current levels of immigration, especially in regard to ethnic minorities. They are also more likely to embrace requirements on which groups of immigrants one should receive, emphasizing not only educational, language, and working skills but are also that immigrants should be committed to the country's way of life. They are also clearly more negative to the consequences of immigration for society, especially in regards to putting a strain on the welfare state and undermining cultural life, combining nativist ("one country, one people") and strict gatekeeping attitudes with strong welfare concerns. They differ mainly in that Anti-immigrants are even more negative about the impact of *all* immigrants, and the Sceptics are more open to immigration by people with more similar ethnic backgrounds.⁵ In contrast to Anti-Immigrants, who are over-represented by people voting for the radical right, Sceptics are overrepresented among older people. Similar to these two groups, *Integrators* emphasize the need for "useful" skills for immigrants for integration in everyday life, education, and work, but are like *Humanitarians*, more positive to receive immigrants of all kinds, see the effect of immigration on the country as generally beneficial, and hold stronger egalitarian views (e.g., agreeing that immigrants should have the same rights as everyone else). Humanitarians differ primarily by their strong resistance to requirements for immigration of any kind.⁶ They are more common among younger people and people on the political left.

Figure 1: A statistical typology of four dispositions to immigration in Scandinavia, and the proportion of each group in the Scandinavian countries in 2002 and 2014. ESS Data.


³ Note that the time of data collection varied somewhat between the countris (Heath, 2014).

⁴ LPA with class-invariant unrestricted parameterization, imputation of missing values based on PCA. The model converges with four classes (entropy = 0.77, suggesting it gives distinct profiles). The probability for each of the four classes is .27, .40, .22 and .11.

⁵ As this typology concerns citizens from countries which in an European context are very positive to immigration, the reader should keep in mind that the labels lean towards the ideal-typic. For example, while only 27% of Anti-immigrants agreed that one should receive "some" or "many" from ethnic minorities, only 10% agreed that one should receive none at all.

⁶ Two-thirds of anti-immigrants think we should recive few or no from ethnic minorities, a sentiment shared by half of the sceptics but very few in the two more positive groups. Almost half of the anti-immigrants also want to strictly limit immigrants with similar ethnic backgrounds as themselves, while only one in five of the sceptics do so, and close to none in the positive groups say this. Two thirds of anti-immigrants emphasised educational, language and working skills, and three of four also that immigrants should be committed to the country's way of life. Close to half of anti-immigrants think immigration make the country a worse place to live, while one third of the nativist sceptics do so - again, very few in the other groups hold this view. While they are more likely to see christianity as an important requirement for immigration - one in four do so - only one in six say being white is important.

Group	Gatekeeping values	Qualification for entry	Cost-benefit of immigration
Humanitarians	Receive many	Few	High benefit
Integrators	Receive many	Useful skills, way of life	Some benefit
Sceptics	Receive many from same ethnic group, few others	Useful skills, way of life, similar ethnicity	High cost
Anti-immigrants	Receive few	Useful skills, way of life, similar ethnicity	High cost



In 2002 and 2014, approximately sixty percent of Danish and forty percent of Norwegian citizens place in the anti-immigrant and skeptic clusters - but only twenty percent of Swedes do the same. Moreover, while one in three Swedes place in the most positive group ("Humanitarians"), less than one in five Norwegians and one in seven Danes do the same. Aside from a slight rise in Humanitarians in Sweden and Norway, the size of the clusters is relatively stable (which is also true for the polled attitudes in this period). Controlling for the year of the survey and generation⁷, Danish citizens were more than four times as likely as Swedes as be among the anti-immigrants and three times as likely to place among the skeptics. Swedes were conversely twice as likely to be integrators and almost four times more likely to be humanitarians.

Our findings mostly agree with Bohman's (2018) analysis of the same data⁸: Nativist and economic opposition is most widespread in Denmark, but the latter rises in all the countries in the period. Danes are also most likely to differentiate between categories of immigrants, Swedes the least. An interesting finding noted by Bohman (*ibid.*) is also that Swedes are least prone to take up nuanced positions - they are consistently either negative or positive on the questions, which Bohman links to Swedes' lesser reflection - compared to their Nordic neighbors - on of the potential societal impact of various types of immigration, as illustrated by how the issue has had a low profile in Swedish politics until recently.


⁷ 20-year intervals.

⁸ Note that there are important differences between our analyses: Where Bohman used only three variables and LCA to construct clusters of attitudes, our analysis uses thirteen variables and LPA. Bohmans analysis is also based on the Nordic countries, our analysis only on the three Scandinavian countries.

Looking at the responses in more detail (Figure 4), we find that fewer in all three countries see the effects of immigration as harmful, especially regarding their use of welfare resources and crime, while putting increasing importance on immigrants sharing our ways of life, and have valuable work skills and educational qualifications (these changes are particularly marked in Sweden). Mastery of the majority language also becomes more critical (especially in Denmark). Scandinavians in this period appear to become less threat-focused in their views of immigrants and more concerned about their integration into the welfare system.⁹

Figure 4: Attitudes to immigration by country and year. ESS 2002/14. Summary statistics.

⁹ This does not appear to be only the case of the older generation "dying out", a factor others have been shown to be an important cause for changes in immigration attitudes over time (Hellevik & Hellevik, 2017). For example, all generations born in the periods 1900-49, 1950-69 and after 1969 agree more often in 2014 than 2002 that immigrants make the country a better place to live (regression with interaction between country, year and generation).



The national differences are most marked in regard to the numbers of immigrants to receive, where almost half of the Danish citizens in 2014 wanted to receive few or no immigrants from poor countries, compared to one in four in Norway and one in eight in Sweden. These numbers are more or less unchanged in the period. The question if one should receive a few or many immigrants "from same race/ethnicity" as "majority groups" or

"minority groups", in contrast, shows a clear drop in the number of those negative in all countries. This appears strange unless one considers the possibility that the question does not simply measure people's view of the argument - how many ones should receive - but also an increasing reluctance to (or awareness of the problems of) basing one's opinions on race and ethnicity. This leads us back to the earlier discussion of the many problems with reading polls - including not only the degree such polls reliably express citizens' opinions on immigration but also the possibility that different social groups answer such questions differently. After discussing *what* moved in the Scandinavian opinion of immigrants in this period, we will now instead ask *who* moved - and who did not.

Explanans and explanandum of immigration leanings

There are many explanations for people's varying position-takings on immigration. While the aim of this paper is mainly descriptive, asking what kinds of leanings Scandinavians have held on the immigration issue and how this has varied between countries, groups, and different periods in the larger debate, it is instructive to give a short review of some of the central arguments, not least because this provides some motivation of why classes' leanings on immigration tend to differ.

Efforts to organize the existing literature on attitudes to immigration may be grouped into quasi-typologies of *explanans* and quasi-typologies of *explanandum*. These are subsets of the much larger general and interdisciplinary literature on public opinion, which we will mostly not engage with here. First, as Sides and Citrin (2007) note, the former subset generally identifies two main sources of individual attitudes to immigration: interests and identities, both of which presume a sense of threat as 'a prior condition of hostility to immigration' (p. 478). For example, in the context of the Nordic countries, past studies have looked at links between national identity and immigration (Knudsen, 1997), party-political influence on anti-immigrant attitudes (Bohman, 2011), and perceptions of specific groups such as Russian immigrants (Brylka, Mähönen, & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2015) and asylum seekers (Hercowitz-Amir, Rajzman, & Davidov, 2017). Similarly, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) review two decades of studies explaining mass attitudes to immigration in North America and Western Europe. They distinguish between 'political economy approaches' focusing on 'material self-interest' (e.g., labor market competition) and 'sociopsychological approaches' focusing on 'perceptions of sociotropic effects' of immigration (e.g., threats to the nation) (pp. 226-7; 230). Berg (2015) offers a third organization of explanatory factors into 'personal and social identity' (e.g., an authoritarian personality), self and group interest (e.g., labor market competition), cultural values and beliefs (e.g., cultural stereotypes), social interaction (e.g., the contact hypothesis), and multilevel theories (e.g., intersectionality). These summaries overlap with the comparative, meso-level literature on anti-immigrant parties, which find that such parties oppose immigration because immigrants allegedly threaten the ethno-national identity and possibly liberal values; cause unemployment, criminality and other kinds of social insecurity; and abuse the welfare state (see e.g. Berntzen, 2019; Rydgren, 2007). Finally, at the systemic level, the distinction between interest and identities correspond to Stein Rokkan's distinction between interest-based cleavages and cleavages based on characteristics (Aarebrot & Evjen, 2014). It captures not only the range of factors found to determine attitudes to immigration, but also the fundamental determinants of Western party systems. For instance, the Nordic party systems have been restructured over the last 50 years as socially liberal and culturally conservative radical left and right parties have emerged or gradually mobilized around issues such as multiculturalism and immigration (see e.g. Knutsen, 2017).

Among the variety of explanandum-oriented research are studies that consider how context and immigrant characteristics condition attitudes to immigration. For example, Hellwig and Sinno (2017) find that '[s]ecurity fears affect attitudes towards Muslim immigrants but economic concerns bear on views towards Eastern Europeans' (p. 339). One of the findings in a study using the British Social Attitudes Survey is that emigration from certain countries can trigger racial or cultural prejudice if these countries have ethnically different populations (Dustmann & Preston, 2007). Origin can also matter depending on how immigrants' characteristics trigger perceived cultural and material threats (Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015). A 2012 study showed that Europeans were more opposed to Muslims than other immigrants, especially in Eastern Europe (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008), while Aalberg, Iyengar, and Messing found that Norwegians were more supportive of high-skill immigrants (Aalberg, Iyengar, & Messing, 2011). However, racial cues also had an effect that varied by the respondent's gender. Relatedly, Gorodzeiskym (2011) shows that economic conditions in both the immigrants and the host country matter, as '[s]upport for the exclusion of European foreigners from 'poorer countries' tends to be less pronounced in economically prosperous places while support for the exclusion of European foreigners from 'richer countries' tends to be less pronounced in economically depressed places' (p. 100). For more on the effect of context, see Bohman (2018).

Concerning the effects of media use on people's immigration attitudes, there are plenty of reasons why media *should* matter. Aside from fundamental insight that most of our knowledge of the issue comes from the media and not direct experience (Lippmann, 1922), there are many studies, for example, using framing theory, which argues that media coverage affects changes in attitudes, emotional reactions and behaviors (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2019). Our knowledge of the effect of media coverage on immigration attitudes, however, is still very limited. The studies we do have are very often single-country studies, and they usually rely on cross-sectional data - which preclude causal statistical inferences - and apply narrow measures of immigration attitudes (Theorin & Strömbäck, 2019). Some findings in the literature are that unfavorable attitudes are linked to a higher volume of media use in general and the use of online news, tabloids, alternative media, and commercial television. The generalizability of such findings, however, is highly uncertain (Ibid.). Lacking adequate data to analyze the effects of media use on immigration attitudes, we will instead focus on differences between social classes, which might help us better understand the basic differences in the immigration debates in the three countries.

Education, class, and immigration attitudes

When explaining people's varying attitudes to immigration, the effect of education is often in focus. We know that the highly educated generally have more liberal, more tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minorities, are less religious and more postmaterialistic in their attitudes (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2007). Regarding immigration, they are more likely to express immigrant-friendly attitudes, but the reasons for this are debated (see e.g. Berg, 2016). Education might have a liberating effect, making people more open to new experiences and less likely to believe negative stereotypes of immigrants. Educated people might also have access to more reliable information on the issue. Their higher exposure to "quality news" (Aalberg & Curran, 2012) might, however, also mean that they have lower exposure to, and knowledge of, more problematizing discourse. Broadsheet newspapers, more popular among educated classes, are, for example, often argued to provide less negative framing of migration-related groups (Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008). Education might, furthermore, lead educated

people to conceal anti-immigrant feelings due to having learned normative beliefs of tolerance (Burns & Gimpel, 2000).

Education is, however, just one resource found to vary significantly with people's attitudes to immigration. Other examples are income and position in the labor market. Broad, socio-economic divides in attitudes to immigration are the norm rather than the exception in Europe, although with some differences in magnitude (Heath, Richards, & Ford, 2016). Such resources are the very elements that make a social class (Bourdieu, 1984). It is thus not surprising that such attitudes are also found to vary significantly between classes, as classes appear to meet immigrants and experience the effects of migration very differently. Working classes are generally more likely than middle classes to vote for anti-immigrant parties and have negative attitudes to immigration (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2007). One explanation for this is the classical argument that attitudes often reflect classes different economic interests (Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer, & Platt, 1969), and working classes are, for example, more likely to meet immigrants in competitive situations - including the job market and the housing market (Brox, 1991). Classes might also, due to different life experiences and occupations, also form distinct cultures with their own values, reinforced by conformity and lack of contact with other classes (Bourdieu, 1984; Kohn, 1969). Classes' different values on the immigration issue might also not just reflect their different life conditions and experiences but also be a way for them to distinguish themselves from other classes (Lamont, 1992), analogous to how ethnic groups adopt identity markers based on other stereotypes of them (Barth, 1998).¹⁰

In the context of the over-arching study of the changing public discourse on immigration in Scandinavia, it is interesting to see if the changes we have reported represent general movements or are limited to specific social groups.¹¹ Class differences can give us an idea of the degree of social polarization of immigration debate, which might contribute to the associated moral worth of those arguments (Bourdieu, 1991) - as refined or vulgar, humane or inhumane, and importantly, as appropriate and relevant for "a civilized debate" on the issue, e.g., the limits of the debate. Looking at the ESS data, immigration appears clearly as a classed issue in Scandinavia. In all three countries, seeing immigration as beneficial in the period 2002-14 is markedly more likely for the upper- and middle classes than the working classes, especially regarding the nation's economic growth, job market, and cultural life. The same goes for requirements for immigration, especially in regard to the need for immigrants to be socially integrated - mastering the majority language and having a willingness to share their way of life. The higher the class, the less concerned about such matters. The upper- and middle classes are also more likely to be positive to receive immigrants - of all sorts - but class differences are here smaller when it comes to poor immigrants, whose "worthiness" for immigration appears less controversial. The differences between the classes on these issues are not always large - typically varying between a factor of two to four for Scandinavia considered as a whole¹² - but they are consistent and generally increase the more socially distant the classes are (Table 2). Class divides are most significant for questions about how many immigrants one should receive, second on the consequences of immigration on society, and least concerning the question of requirements for immigration.

¹⁰ The link between education and classes in forming immigration attitudes are more uncertain (but see Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2007), not least because educational capital is one of the things that varies most clearly between classes.

¹¹ As noted, this might not just be because of reasons like those mentioned above, but also because classes might respond to questions about immigration in different ways.

¹² For example, working classes are three times more likely than the upper classes to see immigration as bad for the national economy, and unskilled working classes are five times more likely than cultural upper-middle classes to agree to this.

Table 2: Class¹³ and immigration attitudes in the three countries.

	Anti-immigrants		Sceptics		Integrators		Humanitarians	
	N=2816	N=1081	N=4083	N=2290				
DENMARK	%	OR	%	OR	%	OR	%	OR
Upper middle class, cultural fraction	26%	-2,5	13%	-1,9	39%	2,1	22%	2,7
Upper middle class, balanced capital	33%	-1,8	14%	-1,4	34%	1,9	18%	1,6
Upper middle class, economic fraction	36%	-2,1	19%	-1,0	32%	1,9	14%	1,5
Lower middle class, cultural fraction	32%	-2,3	13%	-1,5	33%	1,9	23%	2,6
Lower middle class, balanced capital	44%	-1,1	15%	1,0	29%	1,2	12%	-1,2
Lower middle class, economic fraction	44%	-1,2	16%	1,1	29%	1,2	10%	-1,0
Working classes	47%	1	18%	1	25%	1	10%	1
<i>Total</i>	40%		18%		27%		15%	
NORWAY								
Upper middle class, cultural fraction	18%	-2,0	6%	-2,4	54%	1,8	23%	1,3
Upper middle class, balanced capital	26%	-1,2	9%	1,0	46%	1,1	19%	1,1
Upper middle class, economic fraction	37%	1,3	8%	-1,2	39%	-1,2	17%	-1,1
Lower middle class, cultural fraction	25%	-1,7	9%	-1,3	40%	-1,1	25%	2,3
Lower middle class, balanced capital	28%	-1,4	8%	1,0	47%	1,6	17%	-1,4
Lower middle class, economic fraction	30%	-1,0	10%	-1,4	40%	1,0	19%	1,2
Working classes	33%	1	12%	1	40%	1	16%	1
<i>Total</i>	28%		10%		41%		21%	
SWEDEN								
Upper middle class, cultural fraction	10%	-1,8	3%	1,0	40%	-1,3	47%	2,4
Upper middle class, balanced capital	14%	-1,3	5%	-1,5	43%	-1,2	38%	1,5
Upper middle class, economic fraction	13%	-1,4	5%	-1,8	43%	-1,1	39%	1,6
Lower middle class, cultural fraction	12%	-1,4	5%	-1,4	42%	-1,4	41%	1,9
Lower middle class, balanced capital	16%	-1,1	7%	-1,0	43%	-1,0	34%	1,1
Lower middle class, economic fraction	11%	-1,6	5%	-1,3	43%	-1,2	40%	1,7
Working classes	18%	1	7%	1	46%	1	30%	1
<i>Total</i>	15%		6%		41%		38%	

Non-minority citizens only (N=9,606). Percentages show the percentages of each class in each cluster, computed as margins following country-specific logistic regression with year, generation (1900-1949, 1950-59, 1969-), and age as control, with interaction between year and country. Odds ratios show the likelihood of a class category placing in a cluster compared with working classes in the same country. For example, a score 2.7 for cultural upper middle classes in Denmark for "Humanitarians" means that are almost three times more likely place in this group, compared with Danish working classes. A negative score means that the group are less likely than the working classes to place in this group.


The differences are not simply between lower and upper classes but also between cultural and economic class fractions. Inside the upper- and middle classes, economic classes are generally twice as likely as cultural classes to see immigration having problematic consequences and to agree to the need for less immigration and various forms of restrictions in the form of immigrants qualifications (e.g., skills), characteristics (e.g., being willing to share our way of life). Attitudes that are often described as "humanitarian", in contrast, appear to follow more clearly cultural capital, where education is a central element. These results are generally in line with broader studies of European attitudes to immigrants, which finds that negative attitudes increase when one moves down from the professionals to the blue-collar workers, but managers are more negative than professionals (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2007).

Whereas in Norway and Denmark, class differences first and foremost appears as a split between anti-immigration attitudes and more moderate (or positive) views, in Sweden, classes

¹³ Simplified ORDC class scheme (Hansen, Flemmen, & Andersen, 2009).

divide instead in regard to positive-egalitarian views, e.g., if immigration is seen as largely beneficial and with few restrictions on whom to receive and an acceptance of many immigrants (Table 3). Norway appears less polarized by class differences than the other countries, differing primarily by lower polarization on the issue of how many immigrants one should receive (both in regard to cultural majorities and minorities), the impact of immigrants on the job market and economy (and welfare system), which might reflect a less strained welfare state. Citizens' opinions, as measured by polls, in this way appear to be divided along similar lines as those found in the analysis of discourse and immigration politics. In Denmark, classes' views collide most strongly - and increasingly so in the period - over the number of immigrants to receive (Figure 5). In Sweden, it is about the cultural benefits or drawbacks of immigration. From the viewpoint of the national elites, then the working classes in Denmark appear "anti-immigration", in Sweden, as "anti-humanitarian".

Figure 5. Class polarization on immigration issues, 2012. Odds ratios, working classes versus cultural middle classes. ESS Data.



The bars suggest to what degree working classes in a country differ (OR) on these issues from the cultural middle classes. Higher odds ratios suggest larger differences and more class polarization on the issue in a country.

Interestingly, the classes have not changed their positions on the immigration issue to the same degree. In 2002-14, those rich in cultural capital were much more likely to change their positions in this period (usually towards more "positive" attitudes) than other classes, and working classes were least likely to do so. The percentage of "humanitarians" among the cultural fractions of the upper and middle classes, for example, increased 8-11% in these twelve years, but only 4-5 among the working classes in the three countries. With the caveat that we are not dealing with longitudinal data but two different populations, one explanation for this might be that they are more receptive to the debate on these issues, but the reasons for this might be many. It might be related to more exposure to the debate in general (they read more news, more books etc.) or to a bias towards the least negative parts of the media discourse (less use of tabloids and alternative media etc.), it might be a general effect (e.g. linked to that they to a larger degree share the language and experiences with those who produce the discourse, or that their neighborhoods and jobs are less likely to be negatively affected), or more specific, related to the fact that many of the most prominent debates in the period was about to the role of immigrants' culture as an asset or problem for their integration. It might also, as noted earlier, just reflect more positive personal experiences with immigration or better awareness of shifting norms rather than a fundamental change in attitudes.

Consensus, controversy, and deviance

While the reasons for classes different views of immigration (and different likelihood to change their opinions in a more positive direction) are very uncertain (we could here quote the famous words of Poincaré that hypotheses are the commonest of raw materials), the social distribution of the arguments, together with their relative rarity as discussed above provides us with some clues of the limits of discourse - how some arguments (e.g., the importance of race and willingness to adapt to Scandinavian ways of life as a requirement for immigration) have been deviant, controversial or part of the consensus (Hallin, 1986) of the period between 2002 and 2014 in Scandinavia.

While the fact that a question is asked about immigration in a poll can probably be taken as a sign of its controversial - but not overly so - nature, the degree of controversy varies between the questions and the countries. Arguments that immigrants should be white or that there should be no immigration at all - are clearly deviant in all countries, while the argument that one should receive "some" immigrants are mostly accepted. The argument that one should receive few or no immigrants, in contrast, is accepted by very few in Sweden, but the reverse is true for receiving many immigrants in the other two countries.

With the exception of that immigrants should share the native's "way of life", agreement to requirements for immigration varies much - from very low in Sweden to relatively high in Denmark. The two countries differ in particular in regard to the need for immigrants to have "useful" skills (a good education or valuable work skills) and speak the language, with more than half in Denmark agreeing to this, but approximately only one in three in Sweden. Sweden also stands out by high consensus on immigration as beneficial to cultural life, a view that is much more disputed in the other two countries. Norway is as usual an intermediate case, but in these questions appear closer to Denmark than Sweden.

In sum, then, arguments of the existence of an "Åsiktskorridor" in Sweden appear partly supported by the data, as arguments for restrictions on the number or type of immigrants and the problematic sides of immigration are rarer than in the other two countries.

Conclusion

While there is considerable disagreement on to what degree peoples voting patterns and poll results can be read as accurately reflecting people's attitudes on the immigration issue (and even if it is meaningful to think of them as attitudes at all), a careful reading and reanalysis of available data suggest some developments and difference in the case of the Scandinavian countries. First, the emergence and stabilization of immigrant-critical political parties appear to express the emergence not only of a group of politicians but also a broader public that considered immigration as a critical and troubling issue for the well-being of their society. This appears already in the seventies in Denmark, but first decades later in Sweden, which matches trends in the public policies on immigration and the media coverage.

In contrast, longer trends in polls suggest increasingly favorable attitudes to immigrants in all countries. Closer readings complicate this story. At the one hand, there are less emphasis on race as a criterion for exclusion and attitudes appear less threat-focused. On the other hand, increasing importance has been placed on immigrants sharing our ways of life, and have valuable work skills and educational qualifications for integration into the welfare system. While this can be read as an increasing problematizing view of migration, it can also be read as an increasing recognition (Honneth, 1996) of immigrants as citizens.

Danes appear to have the strongest nativist and economic opposition and to discern most strongly between categories of immigrants for who should be admitted. Swedes are the opposite, but such national differences appear to be decreasing (Bohman, 2018), just like national policies do (ch Anniken). Looking at class differences in the later decades, it is clear that seeing immigration as detrimental is more common for the working-class parts of the population in all countries, which is an expected result from the literature and the fact that these are more likely to vote for immigrant-critical parties. Importantly, however, the classes in the three countries are divided over somewhat different parts of the immigration issue. In Denmark, classes collide over the question of the number of immigrants to receive, in Sweden, where this issue has been more or less outside the accepted limits for the debate, the classes clash over the cultural benefits of immigration.

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